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Commentary
Patrick Parkinson
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this discussion
of the pre-commitment approach to achieving regulatory
objectives relating to bank capital. 
The presenters might reasonably expect the discus-
sant to take up each of their papers in turn, commenting
on their strengths and weaknesses and offering an overall
assessment of their quality. I am concerned, however, that
while the usual approach might best do justice to the pre-
senters, it could leave the audience at something of a loss
as to what to make of all this. So I am going to take a
different approach. I will begin by briefly reviewing the
objective of capital regulation and identifying the factors
that make achieving that objective so complex and diffi-
cult. In that context, I will then try to frame the debate
between proponents of the more traditional approaches to
capital regulation and proponents of incentive-based
approaches, including the pre-commitment approach, in
terms of three basic questions. First, how effective is the
current internal models approach to capital for market
risk? Second, is the pre-commitment approach a viable
alternative? Third, can the two approaches be integrated in
ways that play to their respective strengths while avoiding
their respective weaknesses? Most of the major arguments
made by the presenters will surface in addressing these
questions. I shall conclude by offering my own views on
these key questions.
CAPITAL REGULATION: OBJECTIVES 
AND APPROACHES
In general terms, there seems to be agreement on the objec-
tive of capital regulation. Regulators seek to ensure that
banks maintain sufficient capital so that banks’ portfolio
choices fully reflect risks as well as returns. Regulation is
necessary because the government safety nets that support
banks weaken the incentives for capital adequacy that
would otherwise be provided by the market discipline of
bank creditors, a phenomenon that is usually called “moral
hazard.” An important difficulty facing regulators as they
attempt to achieve their objective is that the riskiness of
banks’ portfolios is not readily ascertainable. Traditional
approaches to capital regulation have placed ex ante restric-
tions on bank portfolios that have been based on regulatory
risk measurement schemes of lesser or greater sophistica-
tion and complexity. Inevitably, however, such regulatory
measurement schemes are simpler and less accurate than
banks’ own risk measurement schemes.
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As a result, such schemes are not incentive-
compatible, that is, they do not create incentives for banks
to make decisions that produce outcomes consistent with
regulatory objectives. To the contrary, they create the
motive and the opportunity for banks to engage in regula-
tory arbitrage that frustrates the achievement of regulatory
objectives. Specifically, they create incentives for banks to
reduce holdings of assets whose risks are overestimated by
regulators and to increase holdings of assets whose risks are
underestimated by regulators. Regulators may seek to
compensate for such reactions by raising the level of capital
requirements, but such actions may intensify the incentives
for regulatory arbitrage without meaningfully reducing the
opportunities.
Incentive-compatible approaches to capital regula-
tion are intended to solve this problem by inducing banks
to take actions that reveal their superior information
about the riskiness of their portfolios. In some of these
approaches, including the pre-commitment approach, the
inducement takes the form of ex post penalties that are
imposed on banks in the event that portfolios produce
sizable losses. For example, under the pre-commitment
approach, a bank would be required to specify the amount
of capital it chose to allocate to cover market risks. If
cumulative trading portfolio losses over some subsequent
interval exceeded the commitment, the bank would be
penalized. In principle, the prospect of future penalties
would induce banks to commit an amount of capital that
reflected their private information on the riskiness of their
portfolios.
None of this, it should be emphasized, is news to
regulators. In particular, the recent evolution of capital
requirements for market risks has reflected a growing
recognition of the limitations of supervisory risk measure-
ment schemes, the potential for regulatory arbitrage to
undermine achievement of regulatory objectives, and the
importance of incentive compatibility. Specifically, the
January 1996 amendments to the Basle Accord included an
internal models approach (IMA) to setting capital require-
ments for the market risks of assets and liabilities that are
carried in banks’ trading accounts. Under the IMA, the
capital requirement for a bank that meets certain qualitative
and quantitative standards for its risk measurement and
risk management procedures is set equal to a multiple of a
widely used measure of market risk—so-called value at risk
(VaR)—that is estimated using the bank’s own internal
model. The minimum multiplier was arbitrarily set equal
to three. However, subject to this floor, the IMA provided
economic incentives for accurate risk measurement by
imposing a penalty—a “plus factor” that could increase a
bank’s VaR multiplier to a maximum of four if the bank
fails a “back-test” of its VaR estimates, that is, if its daily
trading losses exceeded its VaR estimates with sufficient
frequency.
Thus far, however, supervisors have been unwill-
ing to rely more heavily on incentive approaches to capital
regulation. In particular, although the Federal Reserve
System continues to study the pre-commitment approach,
that approach is not currently under active consideration
by the Basle Committee. Most regulators seem to believe
that the IMA will prove quite effective, and some have
openly questioned the viability of the pre-commitment
approach.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNAL 
MODELS APPROACH
On the efficacy of the internal models approach, Daripa
and Varotto characterize it as “a ‘hard-link’ regime that sets
a relation between exposure and capital requirement.”
They do not mean to imply, however, that VaR is a perfect
measure of risk. They acknowledge that VaR is subject to
measurement problems and that the use of a fixed holding
period in computing VaR ignores management informa-
tion about the liquidity of markets that might imply that
use of a shorter or longer holding period might be appro-
priate. Still, they seem to think that VaR, if anything,
overestimates risk and, therefore, that the IMA is a prudent,
if somewhat costly, means of ensuring that regulatory
objectives relating to capital are met.
The New York Clearing House Association evi-
dently is more skeptical of the effectiveness of the IMA,
although its criticism of the approach is surprisingly
oblique. The Clearing House’s report does state clearly that
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minimum multiplier of three results in excessive regula-
tory capital requirements—the amounts that institutions
pre-committed during the pilot generally were signifi-
cantly less than those implied by applying the minimum
multiplier to the firms’ internal VaR estimates. Further-
more, they argue that the use of any fixed multiplier, even
if it was smaller than three, is not an appropriate means of
establishing a regulatory capital requirement. Use of a
fixed multiplier constitutes a “one-size-fits-all” approach
that they feel does not adequately account for differences in
the nature of banks’ trading businesses and trading portfo-
lios. Finally, they note that market risk is but one source of
risk in a trading business. The participating institutions
fear that possible future efforts by regulators to develop
capital charges for operational risks (or even legal risks
or settlement risks) will be fraught with complications and
inefficiencies that could be avoided through use of the
pre-commitment approach.
VIABILITY OF THE PRE-COMMITMENT 
APPROACH
On the viability of the pre-commitment approach as an
alternative to the IMA, the Clearing House’s report asserts
that the pilot demonstrates that the approach is a viable
alternative to the IMA. In a narrow sense, this is true—the
pilot demonstrated that the participating institutions have
internal procedures for allocating capital for market risks
and other risks in their trading businesses. However, what
the pilot did not, and realistically could not, demonstrate
is that these internal allocations are sufficiently large to
meet regulatory objectives with respect to minimum bank
capital. The fact that no participating institution reported
a loss in excess of its commitment during the pilot is not
compelling. None of the institutions incurred a cumulative
loss over any of the four quarters. Hence, no violations
would have occurred if no capital was committed. To be
fair, without a more precise understanding of the desired
loss coverage of regulatory minimum capital requirements,
the report could not be expected to demonstrate that pre-
commitment is a viable means of meeting that objective.
Both Kobayakawa, and Daripa and Varotto cast
doubt on the viability of the pre-commitment approach,
at least in its present form. Kobayakawa concludes that a
simple penalty—in the form of a fine proportional to the
amount by which cumulative losses exceed the capital
commitment—would not reliably induce banks to com-
mit amounts of capital commensurate with their private
information on their riskiness. In their presentation
tomorrow, Paul Kupiec and Jim O’Brien, who developed
the theoretical model that motivated the pre-commitment
approach, reach the same conclusion. The fundamental
problem is that a one-size-fits-all approach to setting
penalties would not work. To achieve regulatory objec-
tives reliably, the penalty would need to be bank-specific.
Moreover, the appropriate penalty would depend on a
bank’s cost of capital and on its individual investment
opportunities, factors that unfortunately are not ascer-
tainable by regulators.
Daripa and Varotto argue that the effectiveness of
the pre-commitment approach could be undermined by
principal-agent problems between shareholders and bank
managers and that the internal models approach is immune
to such problems. The potential importance of agency
problems in banking certainly is incontrovertible. When
managers or staff have different objectives and incentives
than shareholders, shareholders can suffer greatly, as the
Barings, Daiwa, and numerous other episodes have made
clear. In addition, it may be that agency problems could
undermine the pre-commitment approach. What seems
implausible, however, is the claim that the IMA avoids
such problems. This claim seems to be a corollary of the
view that the IMA creates a hard link between risk and
capital. To be sure, it creates a hard link between VaR and
capital, but VaR and risk are hardly the same thing. To see
this, one need only ask—would a VaR-based capital
requirement have saved Barings from its fatal agency prob-
lem? Clearly not. The fatal positions were hidden from
senior management, shareholders, and regulators, and
would not have entered into any calculation of VaR nor
been covered by a VaR-based capital requirement. Both the
IMA and the pre-commitment approach recognize that
quantitative controls (VaR measures or penalties, respec-
tively) must be supplemented by qualitative requirements
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the internal controls that are the only realistic solution to
potential agency problems.
CAN THE INTERNAL MODELS 
AND PRE-COMMITMENT APPROACHES 
BE INTEGRATED?
Although both Kobayakawa, and Daripa and Varotto are
critical of the pre-commitment approach as proposed,
they are, it should be emphasized, fully appreciative and
supportive of incentive-compatible capital regulation.
Kobayakawa suggests amending the pre-commitment
approach to offer banks a schedule of combinations of ex ante
capital requirements and ex post penalties that he claims
would induce banks to reveal to regulators their private
information about the riskiness of their portfolios. As he
claims, his approach would more reliably achieve regula-
tory objectives than a pre-commitment approach that uti-
lizes a uniform penalty for all banks. Nonetheless,
Kobayakawa’s alternative faces the same practical difficul-
ties that Kupiec and O’Brien have acknowledged as limit-
ing the effectiveness of the pre-commitment approach and
any other incentive-compatible approaches. Specifically,
banks will reveal their “riskiness” through their choices
from Kobayakawa’s menu only if he sets the “schedules” of
the capital requirements and penalties quite adroitly. But
doing so requires extensive knowledge of banks’ portfolio
opportunities and capital costs that regulators simply do
not (and realistically cannot) possess.
Daripa and Varotto suggest that the pre-commitment
approach be amended to provide for use of the IMA as the
penalty for violating a pre-commitment. Although they do
not provide a formal theoretical justification for their sug-
gestion, they reason that the future prospect of what they
see as a hard-link internal models approach would dimin-
ish the agency problems that they argue are unique to the
pre-commitment approach. As indicated earlier, agency
problems are not unique to pre-commitment, nor can they
be eradicated by use of a VaR-based capital requirement.
However, an alternative way of looking at their
suggestion is as a modification of the IMA. In this regard,
it does address some of the concerns that the Clearing
House report expressed about the IMA. Daripa and
Varotto’s suggested approach is not a one-size-fits-all
approach, and it would eliminate the minimum and pur-
portedly excessively conservative multiplier of three, at least
for banks that had never violated their pre-commitment.
Of course, this type of penalty scheme is opposed in the
Clearing House report. They argue that the appropriate
penalty for violation of a pre-commitment would be public
disclosure that a violation had occurred and that regulatory
penalties would be unnecessary.
MY OWN VIEWS ON THE ISSUES
My views on the issues raised by the presenters will per-
haps please no one. In brief, I see ample room to question
the effectiveness of the IMA. But I am sympathetic to reg-
ulators’ concerns about reliance on a pure incentives-based
approach. Thus, I believe consideration should be given to
more modest alternatives to the IMA that would loosen
but not eliminate ex ante restrictions while enhancing and
reorienting the use of ex post penalties.
Regarding the IMA, its essential weakness is the
tenuous link between VaR and regulatory capital objec-
tives. VaR is defined as a 99 percent confidence limit for
potential losses over a one-day period. But regulators are
concerned about the potential for cumulative losses from
more extreme price movements over longer time horizons.
In such circumstances, application of a multiplier to a
bank’s VaR estimate is clearly necessary. However, as the
Clearing House report argues, the appropriate multiplier
needs to be portfolio-specific and probably bank-specific as
well, to take account of banks’ different abilities to curb
losses through active portfolio management. The choice of
three as a minimum multiplier no doubt is excessive for
some portfolios and may, as the Clearing House report sug-
gests, be too conservative for the portfolios currently held
by most banks. In practice, this may provide incentives for
banks to focus trading activities on illiquid instruments,
such as emerging market currencies and debt instruments,
for which even a multiplier of three may be insufficient.
Furthermore, because of the tenuous link between VaR and
regulatory objectives, back-testing of VaR estimates is of
limited value. A bank that passed its back-test could suffer
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than those allowed for by the VaR estimates. Conversely, a
bank with poor VaR estimates might not be vulnerable to
large cumulative losses if its positions were held in very
liquid markets and it had the capacity to close out those
positions promptly.
Regarding pre-commitment and other incentive-
based approaches, they have their own limitations, and
those limitations should be recognized. The most recent
work by Kupiec and O’Brien has acknowledged that the
link between any simple system of ex post penalties and
regulatory capital objectives is also tenuous. The penalty
appropriate to achieving regulatory objectives relating to
capital coverage for trading risks is bank-specific and
depends on characteristics that cannot be measured pre-
cisely by regulators. Moreover, the efficacy of an approach
that relies on ex post penalties to influence bank behavior
implicitly assumes that the bank is forward-looking and
takes the potential penalties into account when making its
current capital allocation. This is a reasonable assumption
for healthy banks that are managed as going concerns, but
Kupiec and O’Brien have acknowledged that weak banks
may not care about future penalties that, in the extreme,
might not be enforceable owing to insolvency.
In the end, I find merit in Daripa and Varotto’s
suggested modification to the pre-commitment approach,
although I think it more useful to view it as a modification
to the IMA. Institutions would be free to choose a capital
allocation for risks in their trading activities—not only
market risks but also operational and legal risks—that is
less than three times VaR. However, if losses exceeded the
capital allocated, the existing IMA would be reimposed for
some extended period, presumably with a large “plus factor,”
that is, a multiplier larger than three. To assuage regulators’
legitimate concerns about the limitations of incentive-
based approaches, a floor might be placed under the pre-
commitment, perhaps expressed as a multiple of VaR.
However, to enhance incentives for ongoing improvements
in risk management and to diminish incentives for counter-
productive and costly regulatory arbitrage, the minimum
should be well below the existing minimum of three
times VaR.
In effect, this would involve two important
changes to the tests and penalties embodied in the existing
IMA. First, the back-test would be based not on daily VaR
measurement but on cumulative quarterly risk manage-
ment performance as reflected in the quarterly profit and
loss. Second, favorable back-test results, that is, successful
efforts to avoid losses in excess of commitments, would be
rewarded—in effect, a “minus” would be subtracted from
the standard multiplier of three. Furthermore, the minus
would not be some arbitrary amount, but instead would
reflect banks’ judgments about their ability to avoid losses
in their trading businesses.
Clearly, these would not be radical changes. But
they would be important ones, ones that would relate capi-
tal requirements more closely to regulatory objectives and
provide stronger incentives for banks to sharpen their skills
at risk management rather than their skills at regulatory
arbitrage. They would, I believe, be consistent with the
widely shared belief that regulatory capital requirements
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